Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1965

Bogie's, Incorporated v. Salt Lake County, A
Corporate Body Politic : Brief of Respondent

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.George E. Bridwell; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bogie's v. Salt Lake County, No. 10397 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3679

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BOGIES, INCORPORATED,
)
Plaintiff-Reapondent,
Case No.
10897

vs.

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a corporate
body politic,
Defendant-A. ppel"lant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third J'udieial Distriet Comt,
in and for Salt Lake County,
Honorable Stewart M. BansoD, Judge

GEORGE E. BRIDWELL
506 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

GROVER A. GILES
Salt Lake County Attorney
RALPH L. JERMAN
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
513 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, utah
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

FILED
SEP3 0 1965

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Statement of the Nature of the Case ------------------------ 1
Disposition in Lower Court -------------------------------------- 2
Relief Sought on Appeal -------------------------------------------- 2
Statement of Facts ------------------------------------------------------ 2
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
Defendant, by its past conduct in failing to enforce zoning ordinances in connection with plaintiff's business, and in making annual renewals, after
plaintiff relied on such past conduct, is now estopped
from refusing plaintiff a license to operate its business at those premises as had been done in the past.__ 5
Conclusion ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
STATUTES
17-1-21, 1953 Utah Code Annotated -----------------------17-4 et seq. 1953 Utah Code Annotated --~---------------

3
3

CASES CITED
District of Columbia vs. Cahill, 54 Fed. 2nd 453
( CADC 1931) ------------------------------------------------------ 8
Fass vs. City of Highland Park, 326 Mich. 19;
39 NW 2nd, 336 (1940) ------------------------------------ 7
Morrison vs. Horne, 12 Utah 2nd 131; 363 Pac.
2nd 1113 ( 1961) -------------------------------------------------- 6
People ex rel. Beardsley vs. Rock Island, 215 Ill.
488; 7 4 NE 427 ---------------------------------------------------- 9
TEXT CITED
19 Am. Jur. Estoppel, Sec. 168, p. 821 --------------------

6

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BOGIES, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

~\
Case No.

vs.

10397

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a corporate )
Defendant-Appellant.
body politic,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE
CASE
This action was brought by a corporate tavern
Lessee-operator, not a building owner, to compel the
Salt Lake Licensing Director to issue a Class B beer
license and Liquor Consumption license. The licenses
had been refused on the basis that applicable zoning
did not allow that type of business, though they had
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been granted historically for 6 years prior to the instant
refusal, with plaintiff having been in possession for one
year prior to refusal.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LO,iVER COURT
Case was heard upon stipulated facts and reciprocal
motions for summary judgment. After argument, the
trial Court held that Salt Lake County, by its prior
conduct of ignoring the enforcement of zoning and
subsequent annual renewals, is now estopped from
refusing plaintiff a license to operate the premises as
they had been operated in the past. The Court ordered
that such licenses shall continue to be issued for so long
as plaintiff remains in possession of said premises under
its present lease.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent contends that the judgment of the
trial Court should be affirmed.
STATElVIENT OF FACTS
Since the case was tried upon stipulated facts, that
Stipulation is herewith set forth in full:

I.
"Plaintiff is a corporation licensed to do business in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
2

an<l Defendant is a corporate body politic existing
urnler and by virtue of Title 17, Ch. 4, et seq., 1953
Utah Code Annotated, and is authorized to license
cabarets au<l issue beer licenses and liquor consumption licenses within the confines of the County of
Salt Lake, State of Utah, as set forth in Title 17,
Ch. 1, Sec. 21, 1953 Utah Code Annotated, and
that business, known as the Black Hand Lounge,
1s within the confines of defendant County, and is
situate at 7263 South State Street, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

II.
"Commencing in the year 1958 the premises
popularly known as 7263 South State Street, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, were licensed by
Defendant to se:rve bottle and draft beer, and the
premises situate there have continuously since said
date been so licensed by Defendant until objection
was raised on the 30th day of June, 1964.

III.
"On or about the 21st day of January, 1963,
Plaintiff leased said premises for a term which expires in November, 1967, with an option for renewal for an additional five years for use as a
cabaret, and in reliance upon being permitted
license for Class B beer and liquor consumption
li~enses, and since said day and until the 30th day
of June, 1964, said business has been so conducted
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under license from Defendant by Plaintiff, though
during the period July 1, 1963 to June 30, 1964,
licenses were issued in the name of one, Reba J.
Clerico, who was merely in there as an operator
for Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has since the 21st day
of January, 1963, been the sole and only person
authorized to conduct business upon said premises,
individuals named being only managers.

IV.
On or about the 1st day of October, 1963,
Defendant notified Plaintiff that subsequent licenses would not be issued because said premises
were zoned C-2 and not C-3, as required for the
type license historically issued upon said premises.

v.
Plaintiff has made substantial improvements
at said premises and is absolutely obligated upon
the lease for said premises through the month of
November, 1967, and the continuing and accruing
sum of Two Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars
($225.00) per month in an absolute obligation from
Plaintiff-Lessee to the Lessor of said premises.

VI.
It is agreed that the sole and only issue to be
determined in this matter is whether or not Defendant should be estopped from preventing relicensing upon the basis of improper zoning by
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reason of past acquiescence in waiving zoning requirements and the reasonable reliance thereon by
Plaintiffs of past acquiescence and permissive violation of said zoning ordinance, and upon that basis
the issue of law to be determined is should the Court
issue an order compelling permanent annual renewal of said type licenses for said premises for
so long as said premises are maintained and operated by Plaintiff strictly in accord with all other
ordinances of Salt Lake County, State of Utah."

ARGUMENT

Point One: Defendant, by its past conduct in failing to enforce zoning ordinances in connection with
plaintiff's business, and in making annual renewals,
after plaintiff relied on such past conduct, is now estopped from refusing plaintiff a license to operate its
business at those premises as had been done in the past.
It must be clearly understood that these premises
had been licensed for the conduct of a cabaret commencing in the year 1958. The licenses were renewed
annually by defendant in the years 1959, 1960, 1961,
and 1962. In 1963, plaintiff took the lease relying upon
past apparency that such premises could be operated
as a cabaret. Plaintiff was first licensed and operated
ihe premises in 1963 and was refused licenses in 1964.

Most certainly, plaintiff would not have obligated
itself to an absolute lease through the month of No-
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vember, 1967, had it not relied upon the concept that
there was assured future use because of past use and
initial grant of license. If licenses had not been granted,
the lease would not have been made.
There is modern tendency to invoke estoppels
against public authority when equity and justice require
such application. See 19 Am. Jur. Estoppel, Sec. 168,
p. 821.
Appellant relies upon the Utah case of Morrison
vs. Horne, 12 Utah 2nd 131; 363 Pac. 2nd 1113 (1961),
as authority for the denial by this Court of invoking
equitable principals of estoppel against municipalities.
That case is distinguishable. The plaintiff in that action
purchased so-called commercial property that was in
a residential zone at a period that was after 5 years
from abandonment of its use as a store. The plaintiff
attempetd to show that the prior owners and himself
had determined, prior to this 5 years' abandonment,
that the property would be used as a service station,
eventually. This Court held that no such proof was
offered and the case held there was abandonment of
a prior non-conforming use for more than a year under
the statute. It did not appear that the plaintiff made
any undertaking or expenditures in reliance on the
right to be granted a service station, as distinguished
from a mercantile store, on the basis of the assessor's
mistake in carrying the property as commercial rather
than residential. Also, there was attempt to change a
prior use which plaintiff here is not attempting.
6

The zoning in the case at bar is in a commercial
area on South State Street in Salt Lake County, Utah,
and there is another cabaret properly zoned for operation within 200 yards of the premises of plaintiff. Considering similar competing business very close together, with 4 years' history of operation, ordinary
persons should be entitled to rely upon a 4-year past
operation, when to deny them that right makes them
liable to their lessor for the sum of Two Hundred
Twenty-Five Dollars ($225.00) per month through the
month of November, 1967.
Defendant-Appellant's statement that there is no
claim or evidence that another business properly allowed by zoning cannot be profitably operated on the
premises is a non-sequitor, because plaintiff is a cabaret
operator. Such concept might become important, as
pointed out in the case of Fass vs. City of Highland
Park, 326 :Mich. 19; 39 NW 2nd, 336 (1949), if the
plaintiff here was owner of the property. Most certainly
a purchaser of property should be more wary and more
chargeable with zoning restrictions on property he
purchases than would ordinary persons who are merely
leasing premises for the continuation of a business that
has been historically operated by others.
This Court could well distinguish between a purchaser of property having constructive notice of zoning
regulations pertaining to the property to be purchased,
and one who merely leases a going concern in reliance
on appearance in a general business area where other
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similar businesses are conducted and where the leased
premises have been used for the identical type business
for a long period of years prior to leasing.
Despite respondent's urging this Court to distinguish between lessees of a continuing business and purchasers of a new property, there is the case of District
of Columbia vs. Cahill, 54 Fed. 2nd 453 (CADC 1931),
that did not make that distinction, yet ruled in favor
of a person having a business in an improper zone.
From 1911 to 1926, prior owners of the property and
successive tenants openly conducted a garage and storage business without objection. In 1926, Cahill bought
the property and applied for and received a building
permit to repair and improve it as a garage. The permit
was issued and the owner spent $6,000 on improvement
before the permit was revoked. The District Court
voided the revocation and the Circuit Court affirmed,
acknowledging that this is the type case warranting
application of estoppel against a municipal body.
This Court should also so rule, because of historical
operation and initial grant of licenses to this plaintiff
by Salt Lake County. This record states that substantial
improvements have been made by plaintiff on the lease<l
premises, and it is submitted that the rationale and
holding of the Washington, D.C., case is on all fours
with the case at bar. Affirming the Trial Court assures
the perpetuation of the concept that the ultimate object
of equity is to see that justice under all the circumstances
is done.
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Respondent urges that in this case the public authority, in the exercise of proper supervisory and overseeing
authority could, and perhaps should, have prevented the
commencement of this type business in an improper zone
in the year it was first licensed, 1958. It didn't, and
the business operated for six ( 6) years before attempts
to close it were initiated, after plaintiff had it only one
(I) year and had assumed long term lease liability and
made substantial improvements.
Presumably any member of the public injured by
improper business in an improper zone had the same
right to object to the same public authority, but didn't.
There was not only long failure to act which was
passive acquiescence, but there was positive action taken
by the public authority in the initial granting of license
and positive action on each annual renewal.
Plaintiff reasonably acted on past action and appearance and reasonably made substantial improvements, not only with the active approval of the public
authority, but also with the apparent approval of the
affected public. Supra, People ex. rel. Beardsley vs.
Rod'. Island, 215 Ill. 488; 74 NE 437.
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CONCLUSION

•
II

Principles of equity require that defendant be j
estopped from putting plaintiff out of business until its
lease expires, by its terms. The trial court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL
Attorney for Respondent
506 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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